Author: Paul Della Guardia

The World Bank Group-International Monetary Fund Annual Meetings drew to a close in Marrakech this past weekend, the first time these events have been held in Africa since the 1973 edition in Nairobi. While the Bank-Fund leadership expressed their usual endorsement of international cooperation and optimism for the future, this year’s agenda also explicitly aimed to address geopolitical fragmentation and fully acknowledged heightened threats to the goals of eradicating poverty; bolstering sustainable, inclusive growth; and preserving macroeconomic stability.

The main problem at this year’s annuals wasn’t a new one and goes by many names: geopolitical competition, fragmentation, deglobalization, trade frictions, or decoupling. A whole host of challenges to multilateral financing efforts stem from the political obstacles to international cooperation that have emerged over the past decade, with the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis marking the end of America’s “unipolar moment” and ushering in a new, more competitive era. The prospects for a new capital increase for multilateral development banks, innovative hybrid financing solutions to boost World Bank lending, and sovereign debt restructuring processes are all suffering from the fractured backdrop.

IMF Global Policy Agenda

The IMF’s policy priorities are a response to the main macroeconomic challenges in today’s global economy:

• tame inflation

• ensure financial stability

• restore fiscal room

• boost medium-term growth

Indeed, inflation has not yet reverted to central bank targets in many countries, while the rapid rise in interest rates in the past few years have strained parts of the US banking system. At the same time, expansionary fiscal policies have pushed up yields on government debt in various countries, with the return of bond vigilantes evident in the US in 2023. The prospect of higher fiscal deficits can also sometimes undermine financial stability, as exemplified by the UK mini-budget straining pension schemes in September 2022. Tighter fiscal policy will be necessary in many countries to guard against future shocks, while appropriate reforms are also widely-needed to revive the dimmed outlook of medium-term growth.

In parallel with the macroeconomic policy priorities, the Fund is pursuing complementary objectives. The IMF launched, with the government of Morocco, the Marrakech Principles for Global Cooperation, which include reinvigorating inclusive and sustainable growth; building resilience; supporting transformational reforms; and strengthening and modernizing global cooperation. These principles are a welcome attempt to stem the tide of global divergences, even if they are unlikely to meet with much success in the short term. In a similar vein, the IMF has attracted more funding for the interest-free Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust and for the climate change-focused Resilience and Sustainability Trust.

Of note, the IMFC Chair committed to concluding the 16th General Review of quotas by December 2023, in light of agreement on a significant increase of quotas this year. Crucially, there seems to be support for quota realignment by June 2025 to reflect current economic realities, including through an updated quota formula. The IMFC has also called for the creation of a third chair on the IMF Executive Board for Sub-Saharan Africa, in order to improve the continent’s representation.

Yet the IMF has not been able to deliver more in the way of impactful policy successes. One potentially high-impact policy area would be finding a solution for re-allocating SDR usage from the wealthy countries that don’t need them to the poorer countries that do. A further work-stream with outsized effects would be to do more to strengthen the Global Financial Safety Net, which includes the IMF’s toolkit, bilateral swap arrangements, regional financial arrangements, and international reserves – a tall order in the current environment.

Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable

The official sector has achieved a modicum of progress on improving the sovereign debt restructuring architecture in recent months. Probably of most importance to private creditors is improved information-sharing during restructurings, with new possibilities for private lenders to access debt sustainability analyses and related elements at the same time as official creditors, under certain conditions. The Fund has highlighted the increasing speed from staff-level approval to Board approval, from 11 months in Chad in 2022, to 9 in Zambia, 6 in Sri Lanka, and 5 in Ghana most recently, while recognizing that this is still above the 2-3 month average in the past.

The IMF maintains that external public debt strains are not currently as high as they were in the 1990s, even considering the existence of larger local debt markets, which has led to some observers wondering if there is a sense of complacency about pending risks in low-income countries. The IMFC welcomed progress in Zambia, Sri Lanka, and Suriname but called for more results in Ghana, Ethiopia, and Malawi, while also calling for stronger creditor coordination for sovereign debt restructurings occurring outside the Common Framework.

One of the main pieces of news to come out of the meetings was that Zambia’s finance ministry and its official creditor committee signed a memorandum of understanding, thus formalizing the agreement reached in June, and paving the way for Zambia to seek comparable treatment from its commercial creditors. It was also revealed that Kenya may be seeking exceptional access to IMF support ahead of a $2 billion bond maturing in June 2024.

There are some other minor new features in the sovereign restructuring framework, regarding cutoff dates (no later than staff-level agreement), state-contingent debt instruments (which shouldn’t be the norm), and the appropriate approaches to domestic debt (case-by-case) and SOE debt. Other areas remain contentious among the various creditor categories, such as appropriate discount rates to be used for NPV calculations for comparability of treatment. There is also no consensus on the treatment of arrears and on debt service suspensions during negotiations.

Show me the money: capital increases for MDBs?

Despite the ongoing efforts of senior staff to convince donor countries to provide more resources for development, the World Bank Group’s ambitions will continue to lack requisite firepower. The cause is an absence of political will in most of the G7 countries to make sufficient financial commitments to development, as evidenced by a succession of broken Western promises. To be sure, some efforts are under way, such as Japan’s pledge to significantly raise its contribution to the IMF’s zero-interest loan tool, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust. For its part, the US may transfer $2 billion in additional funding to the World Bank Group this year, though this is a far cry from the scale that is needed.

Additional annual financing required to meet the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals stands at around $3 trillion. The G20’s Capital Adequacy Review framework suggests that a general capital increase for the multilateral bank system, including the IBRD, could unlock $200 billion in annual lending, with a further $80 billion annually from balance sheet optimization (e.g. callable and hybrid capital). The Center of Global Development suggests that the international development finance system should boost its annual financing by $500 billion by 2030, with multilateral development banks providing $260 billion and national development finance institutions delivering the remainder. Private capital ought to match that half-trillion increase, for a combined public-private total of $1 trillion.

Yet these figures still fall well short of the additional $3 trillion needed annually. By the CGD’s calculations, each dollar of new equity in MDBs can be leveraged for $15 of external sustainable investment financing, of which $7 in direct MDB lending and $8 in private capital. Assuming that private finance can be crowded in to such a degree is likely overly optimistic, as the CGD’s own figures indicate that MDBs currently mobilize only 60 cents for each dollar lent. Even so, public and private stakeholders will have to come up with financing solutions to achieve the SDGs, and this should be possible with enough political will: just look at the over $100 billion raised for Ukraine.

The World Bank’s Evolution Roadmap

The World Bank Group’s recently-appointed president, Ajay Banga, has laid out a roadmap to enhance the organization’s effectiveness. More efficient balance sheet management should unleash $157 billion in additional lending over 10 years, while preserving the Bank’s AAA rating. These measures include increasing the loan to equity ratio, launching a hybrid capital instrument, and creating a portfolio guarantee mechanism. Similarly, management is also exploring solutions using callable capital and SDRs. An elegant approach to channeling some of 2021’s SDR 650 billion windfall could be to have the Bank issue SDR bonds, to be purchased by national central banks.

A number of other changes are in the works under Banga. These include setting up a Global Public Goods Fund to grow concessional resources by attracting funding from governments and philanthropies, exploring maturities of up to 40 years for social and human capital investments, and exploring energy transition solutions. More importantly, efficiency gains are at the heart of the new strategy. There is an objective to slash project review and approval times by a third by simplifying procedures, while partnerships with other MDBs are already being pursued more actively so as to amplify impact. Similarly, Banga’s team plans on scaling knowledge-sharing in order to more easily share impactful solutions, and a private sector investment lab has already been set up to galvanize private financing.

Banga’s plans to streamline processes seem like a requisite pre-condition for convincing donor countries to increase the Bank’s share capital, though even if his team can deliver, any new equity is far from guaranteed. Early signs of the new president’s first few months in the role have demonstrated his dynamism and communication skills, and future success in reforming the institution’s bureaucracy, while likely challenging to achieve, could yield significant development benefits. However, his team is reportedly difficult to approach internally, which could potentially delay progress.

The post Multilateralism limps onward in Marrakech first appeared on Sovereign Vibe.